Full Spectrum:
The Military Invasion of Anthropology

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Abstract

Anthropologists are widely aware of "the issue of security engagement." The cause célèbre, with reason, is the Human Terrain System, with its goal of embedding anthropologists in combat units. Also widely known is FM-24, *Counterinsurgency*, republished by no less than the University of Chicago Press. The HTS has been discussed by many authors, and FM-24 recently got its own *Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual* (Network of Concerned Anthropologists 2009; and see Kelly et al. 2010). But HTS and FM-24 are only two peaks of an iceberg, and will receive only limited consideration here. Instead, this chapter draws on the flotilla of other manuals, reports, and proposals, to demonstrate just how intellectually central, programmatically wide-ranging, and disciplinarily transformational are the military's cultural demands. Anthropologists need to understand that the Department of Defense and other security agencies are already taking what they want from anthropology, and their appropriation of people and knowledge may well transform the meaning of anthropology in the years to come.
This is the third paper about anthropology’s engagement with U.S. military and other security institutions. The first focuses on the Human Terrain System. It marshals evidence that Human Terrain information contributes to lethal targeting, and so participation is ethically proscribed for anthropologists (Ferguson n.d. a). The second (Ferguson n.d.b), a slightly expanded version of a presentation at the American Anthropological Association meetings, deals with the larger security demand for “culture,” categorizing types of effects this demand may have on anthropology. This chapter began as a larger version of the AAA paper, but with additional research, it grew into a project of its own. While still primarily concerned with the impact of security demands on anthropology, the objective here is to outline the main dimensions that military demand, which turn out to be much broader than I had thought. The Department of Defense (DoD) already is processing “culture” throughout its world view, doctrine, and practices. The Human Terrain System is just a small part of this demand, which will quite possibly transform the entire discipline of anthropology over the next decade.

**Military Demand**

For the conquest of Iraq, the gross inadequacy of military establishment thinking is now well understood (Melillo 2006; West 2009). The lesson was learned hard, but fast. By mid 2004, it was obvious.

More than a year after the Iraq war began soldiers are rotating home with a sense of unmet expectations. Consensus seems to be building among them that this conflict was fought brilliantly at the technological level but inadequately at the human level. The human element seems to underlie virtually all of the functional shortcomings chronicled in official reports and media stories.
According to one returning commander, “I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. Great technical intelligence... wrong enemy” (Scales 2004:1).

Major General Scales (2004:3) called for a new form of “culture centric warfare,” but his concept of culture was itself very limited, and his idea about implementation correspondingly undeveloped:

the Department of Defense should be required to built databases that contain the religious and cultural norms for world populations—to identify the interests of the major parties, the cultural taboos—so that soldiers can download the information quickly and use it profitably in the field (2004:9).

Initial attempts to operationalize culture within the military were rudimentary, as in this statement by a retired Colonel (McFarland 2005:66).

Researchers identify four cultural syndromes—complexity, individualism, collectivism, and tightness—that are patterns of beliefs, attitudes, self-definitions, norms, and values organized around some theme that can be found in every society. Using cultural syndromes as a frame of reference, we can develop foundational normative values having common application across all cultures, which should provide the starting point for a cultural education program.

Into this vacuum of military need stepped an anthropological entrepreneur, Montgomery McFate, who along with others proposed a wide ranging engagement of anthropology and military needs (McFate 2005a; 2005b; McFate and Jackson 2005). The proposals found enthusiastic backing from a circle of military intellectuals—“warrior-scholars”—who came out of the West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, or “Sosh” (Axe 2010:62-63). Number one was
David Petraeus. In his vision, the military had to retool for a future of long wars—for population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN). Another major visionary from Sosh was John Nagl (Center for a New American Security n.d.), author of a history of counterinsurgencies (Nagl 2002).

Petraeus, Nagl, and those around them reanimated COIN theory, directed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the population in the area of operations (Kilcullen 2006). To do that, cultural awareness and information are necessities. As the debacle of Iraq became more glaringly apparent, higher powers in the Bush administration threw their weight behind this new vision (Bacevich 2008). The new doctrine went public with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (DoA 2006; and see Gonzalez 2009:8-12; Nagl n.d.).

There was and is much opposition to this shift (Bacevich 2008; Corn 2009; Dunlap 2009; Gentile 2008; Katel 2008). Traditional branches such as artillery are withering, and they have their own constituencies. One may surmise that Special Operations forces are not happy about being sidelined in Afghanistan, because they did not get with COIN doctrine (Oppel and Nordland 2010). Much of Navy and Air Force operations now seem so ’80s. Fighters such as the F-22 are designed for Top Gun dogfights, not tedious “long wars.” Yet critics ask, what happens if North Korea invades South Korea? Turf and money fights are legion and legendary within the DoD. They are intense right now (Gates 2009). Moreover, it is uncertain—I would say highly unlikely—that the new COIN approach will succeed as imagined. What then? But for the foreseeable future, a population/culture-centric orientation to future “security issues” seems secure.

The DoD’s Cultural Revolution. Within two years of Major General Scales’s call for culture-centric warfare, culture-oriented programs were widespread. In September 2006, Mitre
Corporation, which manages federally funded research and development centers, conducted a one day conference on “Socio-Cultural Perspectives: A New Intelligence Paradigm” at the Center for National Security Programs in McLean, VA. Its premise was “that cultural intelligence is important for a wide range of national security endeavors and that this fact is increasingly recognized in many government quarters.” Representatives of “more than 50 different government organizations attended the conference” (Friedland et al. 2007:iii, 9). (I recently met an engineer from Mitre Corporation, who works with StratCom, the new incarnation of the Strategic Air Command. He told me that anthropological input was essential for their intelligence work. Anthropologists, he told me twice, fill the same function today as Indian Scouts did in the days of the old west).

The field has grown substantially since that time. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics (DSB 2009) was tasked to compile information about every DoD “effort or group” dealing with “human dynamics/human terrain/culture” (2009:98-99). Their final table contains 111 entries, not including “the extensive network of expert cultural consultants” maintained by the Army, Air Force and combat commands (2009:xiv). Even so, the Task Force calls for “direct increases in the ‘cultural bench’ by factors of three to five” (2009:xiv-xv). That includes expanding curriculum in military education, improving career paths for human dynamics advisers, providing advanced degree education, and developing innovative processes for recruiting and rewarding outside expertise.

Information requires organization. The Task Force notes that the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Socio-Cultural Dynamics Working Group, with representatives of more than 30 organizations, “has evolved” as the key component in government for managing work by the
“federation of defense intelligence organizations performing socio-cultural dynamics analysis” (2009:73)—but recommends that in the future, the Distributed Common Ground Station be given charge to “organize, store, and distribute ‘human terrain information,’ provide tools to keep that data current, and continuously provide cultural insights from competent social scientists to analysts and operators alike” (2009:xix, 44). It endorses creation of a new Center for Global Engagement, “as a collaborative hub for U.S. government innovation in cultural understanding, communication technology, resource identification, and creative program development,” directed to “engage experts, thought leaders and creative talent from the private sector and civil society” (2009:30).

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE, from General Dynamics, n.d.

“Distributed Common Ground System—Army”

**Culture.** What are they looking for? What is “culture” for the Pentagon? That depends on who you ask. To start, there is the distinction of “Big C” and “little c.” “Little c” is the general culture concept, “Big C” is location-specific cultural information. “Little c” is emphasized regarding cultural awareness and cross-cultural competency; “Big C” is the knowledge required for particular operations (Alrich 2008:34-35). But “little c” also frames “Big C,” and the character of this orienting concept is disputed. It is ruefully amusing to read
DCGS-A Operational Concepts

Figure 1: “Distributed Common Ground System—Army”

Source: General Dynamics, n.d.
that on the question of “what culture is and why it is important... at symposia and other technical workshops, once the subject of definitions is broached, whatever the purpose for the meeting, participants often become mired in a turf war” (2008:37).

Writers acknowledge a variety of definitions of culture within anthropology. A report by the Institute for Defense Analyses (Alrich 2008:33-34), for instance reprints a list of seven anthropological definitions compiled in 1997 by the Peace Corps, though all are very traditional. The DSB Task Force (DSB 2008:69) methodically compared elements present in different unit’s definitions, and found three that three appeared in five different specifications: “beliefs, values, religion, and rituals; (2) norms and rules of behavior; and (3) the social network connecting individuals.” Some definitions settle at the lowest common denominator. So a monograph from the School of Advanced Military Studies, which calls for “weaponizing culture,” follows Samuel P. Huntington with: “culture is the values, beliefs, norms and institutions which transmit patterns of meaning, modes of living and customs within a given society” (Strader 2006:9-10, 62). Even this, however, shows how far things have come compared to the previous DoD definition of culture: “A feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; and in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map” (DSB 2009:12).

Discussions of culture in individual publications vary in how far they go beyond that. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency has about eight pages in Chapter 3 on culture and related topics—much of it lifted verbatim from anthropological publications (Price 2007), plus an appendix on “Social Network Analysis and Other Analytical Tools.” FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (DoA 2009a) and FM 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance (DoA 2009b) both
have about ten pages. The latter discusses social structure, including short paragraphs on groups, institutions, roles and statuses, social norms; and culture, sub-headed under identity, values, and belief systems.

Anthropologists are comfortably accustomed to cacophony on the topic of culture, but that does not suit the Pentagon. If culture is to be at the center of doctrine, it should be precisely defined. "Without a shared definition and ontology, the ability to link formal and computational models of culture to the wealth of cultural data collected in the field can be haphazard and some models will not be interoperable." Nevertheless, "It is unlikely that a single definition of culture will emerge, given that there is no common view as to why a single definition is needed."

Different elements of the military see different applications of "culture" in their own tasks, so "the DoD may be better served by asking ‘what is about culture that the soldier needs to know to improve performance at the tactical, operational, and/or strategic level?’ At each level, different aspects of culture are mission critical" (DSB 2009:70).

This diversity of needs within the DoD stems from the breadth of cultural applications. The military is fond of the term "full spectrum." For applying culture, there are at least three spectrums. One is the spectrum from new recruit to higher echelons and commanders, and all the organizational divisions relating to field operations. All need to be culturized. Another is the spectrum of deployments, from stability missions during "Phase 0", before armed conflict begins, to full scale war. A third is the range of operations, from "kinetic" lethal attacks, to non-lethal cooperation aimed at making or cementing local allies. The objective is to fight smarter to win. The following is a typical statement.

The Army’s operations concept is full spectrum operations: Army forces combine
offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an independent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operation environment (DoA 2008:3-1).

**Applying Culture in Areas of Operations.** Most discussion of anthropology as applied to war zones focuses on the Human Terrain Teams. As discussed elsewhere (Ferguson n.d.a) claims by HTS advocates that their actions support only non-lethal actions is belied by consistent statements by military writers, that cultural awareness and ethnographic information is to be fully integrated into all of a commander’s options. Information gathered by social scientists may be combined with other information and used in lethal targeting. That is why anthropologists should not participate.

It is important to study the Human Terrain issue, in part because the topic is sufficiently narrow to throw stark light on broader ethical issues. But Human Terrain Teams are just a small piece of culture-oriented efforts in the field. One critique of HTS from within military circles is that troops on multiple rotations long ago learned fundamentals of local cultural organization and interactions (Connable 2009:62; Ephron and Spring 2008:2; Sepp 2007:218). A journalist recently in Afghanistan found soldiers who had hardly heard of the Human Terrain System, diligently “mapping the human terrain” and trying to assimilate culturally appropriate, cooperative ways of interacting with the locals. Within military field operations, Civil Affairs and Provincial Reconstruction Teams are already known for their special “linguistic and cultural skills,” and the DoD is seeking ways to integrate them with Human Terrain Teams (QDR
2010:24-25).

It is not clear that HTS will attain the grail of moving from annually funded project to ongoing program. Whether it does or not, the military seems totally committed to a pervasive shift to cultural thinking in field operations. "In effect, the Petraeus Pentagon wants to advance human-terrain theory and practice any way it can—military tradition, dead social scientists and management gaffes be damned" (Axe 2010:68). The DoD assimilation of culture goes far beyond the HTS.

To achieve decisive success in future missions, the military thinks it needs two things: "cultural competence and situational awareness" (DoA 2009a:18). This requires turning members of the armed forces into conscious agents capable of intercultural actions.

At the end of the day, soldiers will have to be immersed in their AO [Area of Operations] and follow the Lawrence and Galula principles of counterinsurgency operations. Immersion offers the ideal learning environment, and is the extrinsic side of cultural awareness. However, it is the intrinsic competence that provides a basis for such learning, and allows one to build upon those skills far after a deployment. Such skills make a better warfighter AND a more dynamic civilian as the soldier moves back into a very competitive and global workforce (Masellis 2009:14).

A few years ago this was seen as a forward-looking need (McFate and Jackson 2005). The Army created a new Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Culture Center, seeking ways "to leverage cultural knowledge to enhance military operation... from instruction for baseline Soldiers at the lowest level to key military decisionmakers at the highest" (Hajjar, 2006:89).

Soon, the need for cultural competence ascended to doctrine, as in Tactics in Counterinsurgency,
with three broad steps of cultural capability: awareness, understanding, and expertise. Each step involves both regional and cross-cultural competence.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE, from DoA 2009a 1-24

"Changes in cultural capability over time"

Cross-cultural competency (3C) includes general cultural knowledge, skills, and attributes. All Soldiers must devote time to developing cross-cultural competency. It forms the foundation for understanding any culture... Regional competence includes culture-specific knowledge, skills, and attributes that pertain to a given country or regions (DoA 2009a:1-24).

Culture-specific knowledge comes from compiling thorough knowledge of local society, which is imagined as a mass of discrete variables, all of which can be operationally specified (DoA 2009a:1-7). A chart of “typical civil considerations” contains 115 cells, including such entries as: ethnicity, social gathering places, security, gangs, parks, power grids, jails, religion, illicit organizations, visual (graffiti, signs), and religious gatherings (DoA 2009a:1-9). All are to be condensed into easy-to-understand map overlays (DoA 2009a:10). But that does not exhaust the delineation of culture. One way to get more comprehensive knowledge is to
Figure 1-5. Changes in cultural capability over time.

Figure 2: "Changes in Cultural Capability Over Time"

Source: DoA 2009:1-24
build a chart that systematically distinguishes, orders, and names groups—a cultural
taxonomy. In order to do this, leaders and staffs must define a culture’s influences,
variations, and manifestations. Cultural influences and variations explain why the culture
is the way it is. Cultural manifestations refer to what one may encounter in a culture.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE, from DoA 2009a:1-19

“Taxonomy of culture”

These over-all characteristics are to be brought to the concrete personal level with
network and event analysis of specific individuals, named and annotated, as emphasized in
Counterinsurgency (DoA 2006, appendix B). The Human Terrain Team Handbook also details
information to be collected for other kinds of mapping, including social networks, association
matrixes, and event coordination registers (Finney 2008:36-37).

Being culturally attuned is expected to give U.S. forces a great tactical advantage over
local populations.

A culture’s behavior consists of actions which can be sensed; specifically a group’s
language, social mores, customs, structures, and institutions. Culturally competent units
understand and train to recognize these behaviors as a means to identify insurgent actions,
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Figure 1-4. Taxonomy of culture.

Figure 3: “Taxonomy of Culture

Source: DoA 2009a:1-19
anticipate the population actions, and detect subtle changes within the population. Actions inconsistent with the population’s behavioral norms could be indicators of guerrilla activity, internal conflict, or the confirmation or denial of intelligence. Living and operating among the population is essential to understanding population behavior (DoA 2009a:1-23)

Put it all together, and what do you get?

A leader or Soldier has begun to achieve culturally influenced situational awareness when he/she can ask and answer such questions accurately: What is my adversary thinking and why? What are my Host Nation security forces thinking and why? What are groups of people thinking and why? What will my adversaries, groups of people, adjacent units, and coalition partners, and Host Nation security forces do if I take action W, and why? How are cultural factors influencing my operations? How can I make groups of people and Host Nation security forces do what I want them to do? (DoA 2009a:1-26)

As the Defense Science Board (DSB 2009:5) puts it, “knowledge of the value system of an actual or potential competitor helps in deterring undesirable behaviors and compelling desirable behaviors.” It is often said, in counterinsurgency, war is fought in and for minds. In the Pentagon’s vision, this one-way cultural mind meld is the gateway to behavior control.

Above and Beyond

Discussion so far has been confined to a fairly delimited use of culture in military operations. But DoD and IC see culture as just one aspect of much wider knowledge integration, involving other sorts of data, other social science perspectives, higher levels of aggregation, and broader purposes of utilization. The following discussions tour through these broader
applications of culture.

**Synthesizing, Sharing, Storing, Centralizing.** Cultural competency and ethnographic intelligence are required in organizational layers above soldiers in the field, beginning with commanders of larger units. David Kilcullen, one of the “warrior-scholars” behind the DoD Cultural Revolution, wrote a manifesto “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency” (2006), reprinted in *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. It instructs commanders: “Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion, and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district” (DoA 2009a: C-2).

How far this concept has actually progressed may be inferred by the assessment of the head of military intelligence in Afghanistan, Michael Flynn.

Sufficient knowledge will not come from slides with little more text than a comic strip. Commanders must demand substantive written narratives and analyses from their intel shops and make the time to read them. There are no shortcuts. Microsoft Word, rather than PowerPoint, should be the tool of choice for intelligence professionals in a counterinsurgency” (Flynn et al 2010:23-24).

Still, “world expert” remains an aspiration, and aspirations go much higher than that. For strategic assessment and planning, this sort of knowledge must be created and made available in usable form at levels above individual Areas of Operations.

Major General Flynn is behind a big push for theater-level comprehensive knowledge. In December 2009, he (2009) made public a scathing power point presentation on the deteriorating state of operations in Afghanistan. In January, he and two intelligence colleagues released
“Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.” It was not put out by the DoD, but by the Center for a New American Security, whose President is John Nagl (Hodge 2010), (so the blueprint itself may be a manifestation of the ongoing battle for the hearts and minds of the military establishment). Flynn et al. (2010) are blistering about the failure of traditional intelligence operations, which focus on covert information leading to killing enemies and the problem of IEDs.

They note that established intelligence operations provide little information useful for leveraging the population against the insurgents, and this opacity gets worse the higher you go. “The tendency to overemphasize detailed information about the enemy at the expense of the political, economic, and cultural environment that supports it becomes even more pronounced at the brigade and regional command levels” (2010:7-8) “We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers (2010:4).

Flynn et al. are not calling for intelligence analysts to become anthropologists. “Open source” publications by anthropologists or field observations by Human Terrain Team members just provide information to go into the bigger mix. The new model for intelligence gatherers and analysts is a journalist.

Select teams of analysts will be empowered to move between field elements, much like journalists, to visit collectors at the grassroots level and carry that information back with them to the regional command level... The analysts will provide all the data they gather to teams of “information brokers” at the regional command level who will organize and disseminate—proactively and on request—all the reports and data gathered at the grassroots level. These special teams of analysts and information brokers will work in what the
authors are calling Stability Operations Information Centers... Leaders must put time and energy into selecting the best, most extroverted and hungriest analysts to serve in the Stability Operations Information Centers. These will be among the most challenging and rewarding jobs an analyst could tackle (2010:4-5).

These extroverted, hungry, roving intelligence agents would debrief the social scientists, getting what they need to know to fill in their larger pictures.

Stability Operations Information Centers are envisioned as functioning much as the current Intelligence and Security Command’s Information Dominance Center, which currently integrates multi-disciplinary information for U.S. major commands (Altendorg n.d.; Anon. n.d.), but the new units would make such knowledge much more accessible. Virtually anyone with a reason the military deems legitimate “should be able to walk in and obtain mission-related information with ease”—comprehensive, succinct, and current (Flynn et al. 2010:19-20). This accumulating mass of data will not remain in overseas areas of combat. The goal is to archive all cultural information from the DoD, the Department of State, and U.S. AID, in permanent, searchable, interoperational data bases, probably at the Distributed Common Ground Station (DSB 2009: xvii-xix).

**Transforming Societies.** In some culture-warrior visions, this operational omniscience is not merely for combat or even stability operations. Its application goes beyond old-style counterinsurgency. It aims to get to the roots of the problem, to eliminate those discontents that fuel insurgencies. The avowed goal is to find out what the local population wants and needs, and then make that happen. This is clear in General McChrystal’s preliminary report on Afghanistan (2009: 2/12-18). His new COIN orientation involves basics such as providing clean water or
electricity, collecting garbage and building roads, but it goes much further. New businesses are
to be conceived and started-up, jobs created, schools built, and crop substitutions guided. Local
and transparent systems of civil administration, finance, and justice are to be developed in place
and purged of corruption. Local communities will be empowered. In Afghanistan, all of this is
to be done in the face of a government which, where it exists at all, is seen as incompetent and
venal. In this vision, U.S. boots on the ground would help build new societies from the ground
up. John Nagl sees the U.S. military as tasked “not just to dominate land operations, but to
change entire societies” (quoted in Bacevich 2008:2).

_Tactics in Counterinsurgency_ (DoA 2009a:7-5-7-28) lists stability tasks, many obviously
requiring local cultural understanding (presented here as listed and _headings_ and subheads):
*establish civil control* (establish public order and safety, establish interim criminal justice system,
support law enforcement and police reform, support judicial reform, support property dispute
resolution, support corrections reform, support public outreach and community rebuilding
programs); *support governance* (support transitional administrations, support anticorruption
initiatives, support elections); *restore essential services* (provide essential civil services, tasks
related to civilian dislocation, support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs,
support public health programs, support education programs); and *support economic and
infrastructure development* (support economic generation and enterprise creation, support public
sector investment programs, support private sector development, protect natural resources and
the environment, support agricultural development programs, restore transportation
infrastructure, restore telecommunications infrastructure, support general infrastructural
reconstruction programs, use money as a weapon).
This is a controversial vision. One friendly critic applauds McChrystal, but believes that the close circle of advisors around him have turned this doctrine into a “theology,” for “armed social engineering” (Corn 2009:11). A even harsher assessment comes from Defense Department Analyst Kalev Sepp (2007:222):

Call it militant Wilsonianism, call it expeditionary democracy, call it counterinsurgency, but this is... decidedly not stabilizing. It is an overturning of nations. It is, at its core, a revolution. American soldiers are the instruments of this revolution... The army would have to lead revolutions on a scale so vast as to completely eclipse what the USA experienced in breaking from Great Britain's imperial rule, or in reconstructing the defeated slave slates of the South following the American Civil War.

One clear illustration of how U.S. security powers may undertake social engineering in open service of neo-liberal is provided by a study supported by the National Defense Intelligence College, titled Registering the Human Terrain: A Valuation of Cadastre (Batson 2008). A cadastre is “a parcel-based up-to-date land information system containing a record of interest in land (e.g. rights, restrictions, and responsibilities)” (2008:3). Lack of such is claimed to be the cause of much social disorder in poorer nations.

The gist of this proposal is summed up in a Foreword by Swen Johnson, Chief of Human Terrain Analysis at Socio-Cultural Intelligence Analysis, Inc., a private company catering to intelligence and counter-terrorism communities.

...while many in the community have been focused on the “where” relating to mapping the human terrain, this book tackles the important issue of who is registered to land through property records... Clearly, the case is made for furthering efforts in registering
the human terrain as a means of achieving goals of national security and global peace and stability... Land issues are often at the core of violent conflict, which could be prevented by the development and implementation of land registration systems with formal mechanisms to arbitrate disputes and make public record of land ownership rights and adjudications (2008:v).

Batson (2008:9) invokes influential neoliberal economist Hernando de Soto, architect of Fujimori’s economic policy in Peru, to assert that:

rule of law defines the relationship between land and people and that formalized property rights bring social order. Once land rights are accessible and formalized, properties can be easily conveyed, exchanged or inherited using protected, affordable legal means.

Property owners, and their countries, then prosper.

He (2008:133-134) endorses a three-stage plan already developed for Afghanistan of developing the technical capacity for mapping property, setting boundaries and registering them locally, then centrally consolidating records (Stanfield et al. n.d.). The global possibilities of this approach are

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE, Batson 2008:xv

“Persons Tied to a Cadastral Parcel”
Figure 3. Persons Tied to a Cadastral Parcel. Source: Bhuvana Anand, EMG.

Figure 4: “Persons Tied to a Cadastral Parcel”

Source: Batson 2008:ww
illustrated by DoD funding of land registration efforts in the possible “trouble spot” of Oaxaca, Mexico, efforts which created a major controversy for geographers (Herlihy et al. 2008; Mychalejko and Ryan 2009; Sedillo 2009).

**Employing Culture to Build Local Security Forces.** Another major category of cultural application in current or prospective battle zones has largely escaped notice by anthropologists: using cultural understanding to enhance communication and cooperation between U.S. and local security forces. Raising the performance of local security is seen as key to all counterinsurgency and stability operations. *FM 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance* quotes the 2008 National Defense Strategy:

> Our strategy emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security... [L]ocal and regional conflicts in particular remain a serious and immediate problem... we will help build the internal capacities of countries at risk... By helping others to police themselves and their regions, we will collectively address threats to the broader international systems” (DoA 2009b:1-2).

One indication of the importance of this area is that John Nagl (2007) calls for a new, permanent force of 20,000 Combat Advisors. That alone would represent a substantial demand for cultural research and education (and see QDR 2010:29).

*FM 3-07.1* has a chapter on society, culture and cross-cultural communication, and a separate one on “cross-cultural influencing and negotiating.” This knowledge and ability is seen as essential for building up forces including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional
personnel—that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission (DoA 2009b:1-1).

Culturally attuned security force assistant is cost-effective, and has the benefit of bringing our partners’ local knowledge into joint operations.

Partnered COIN, in which Afghan and Iraqi units operate in tandem with U.S. forces, is an effective way to train and advise forces while conducting combat operations against insurgents. These partnered host-nation units have the advantage of knowing the terrain, language, and local culture... The model is being applied elsewhere to good effect. [In addition to the Philippines] U.S. forces are working in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Colombia, and elsewhere to provide training, equipment, and advice to their host-country counterparts on how to better seek out and dismantle terrorist and insurgent networks while providing security to populations... As U.S. forces draw down in Iraq and make progress toward building stability in Afghanistan, more capacity will be available for training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces in other parts of the globe (QDR 2010:27-28).

An instructive example provided of successful culturally attuned security force assistance is the training and supervision El Salvadoran armed forces in the 1980s, an exercise with which Robert Gates was involved as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DSB 2009:18-20). For instance, there is Gabe Acosta, a US military intelligence officer in El Salvador.

During his first tour in 1983-1984 he established a set of friendships and relationships that were very helpful... [but] the real pay off came on his second tour in 1990-91. Between tours in El Salvador, as part of his stateside professional military education,
Acosta ended ___?? the School of the Americas, where he made the acquaintance of thirteen more Salvadoran officers. As a result, those officers were completely comfortable in sharing information with him during his second tour in country (Renzi 2006a:18).

Gill (2004) should be consulted on the terrible human rights record of the School of the Americas.

**Global Reach.** Throughout all the discussions on the future of cultural awareness and information in war, the premise is that this is a *global* necessity. Andy Marshall, the secretive Director of the super-secretive Office of Net Assessment, has called for “anthropology-level knowledge of a wide range of cultures” (quoted in McFate 2005:46). (A proposal by Anna Simons and David Tucker, “Improving Human Intelligence in the War or Terrorism: The Need for an Ethnographic Capability” was submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment in 2004, but it is has not been made public [Renzi 2006b:22]). Today the focus is on Iraq and Afghanistan, but plans are in process for Africa, the Pacific, and Latin America (Axe 2010:68; Hodge 2009).

DoD savants see a need to develop deep cultural knowledge and connections all over the world *now*, to begin gathering cultural information for possible future deployments. This was recognized from the first statements of the DoD’s new cultural needs.

At the heart of a cultural-centric approach to future war would be a cadre of global scouts, well educated, with a penchant for languages and a comfort with strange and distant places. These soldiers should be given time to immerse themselves in a single culture and to establish trust with those willing to trust them... Global scouts must be supported
and reinforced with a body of intellectual fellow travelers within the intelligence community who are formally educated in the deductive and inductive skills necessary to understand and interpret intelligently the information and insights provided by scouts in the field. They should attend graduate schools in the disciplines necessary to understand human behavior and cultural anthropology (Scales 2004:4-5).

This concept was fleshed out in an article in Military Review, “Networks: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence” (Renzi 2006b; and see 2006a).

The proliferation of empowered networks makes “ethnographic intelligence” (EI) more important to the United States than ever before... Today, we have little insight into which cultures or networks may soon become threats to our national interests. For this reason, America must seek to understand and develop EI on a global scale, before it is surprised by another unknown or dimly understood society or network...(Renzi 2006b: 16-17).

The United States could develop a corps of personnel dedicated to the task and base them out of a more robust military annex to our embassies. ... a low-key, constant interest in overt ethnographic matters would show that the United States cares and is indeed watching. Perhaps this constant attention would serve to subtly constrict the amount of safe-haven space available for dark networks. The overt information gathered by military ethnographers could complement the covert work done by the CIA (and vice versa)...

Ethnographic intelligence can empower the daily fight against dark networks, and it can help formulate contingency plans that are based on a truly accurate portrayal of the most essential terrain—the human mind... The Nation must invest in specialized people who can pay “constant attention” to “indigenous forms of association and mobilization,” so
that we can see and map the human terrain (Renzi 2006b:20-22).

**Integrating, Modeling and Predicting.** In the DoD vision of omniscience, ethnographic information and theory will be joined with higher tech knowledge to enable behavior prediction. The Defense Science Board (2009:54-57) describes efforts to integrate a cultural focus with neuroscience and sensors. Among them, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, (DARPA, the people who gave us the M-16, drone aircraft, and the internet [Lal 2006:7]), is exploring the potential of neuroscience research and development and its applications to understanding human dynamics. Advances in using neuroscience to understand the basis for human cognition, including non-invasive sensor technologies, may be applicable for understanding perception, the neurological origins of trust and compliance, and the neuroscience of persuasion—all relevant to the topic addressed in this report. The broad concept is to develop quantitative neuroscience tools and techniques to predict the effects of “ideas” within diverse populations.

(Since DARPA is also growing sensors into drivable insect cyborgs [DARPA 2006], the possibilities seem endless, see appendix.)

Cultural knowledge will be brought into high tech targeting systems. In 2007, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense John Wilcox (2007) gave a power point presentation to a meeting of the Precision Strike Winter Roundtable, where the focus was on futuristic weapons systems to eliminate targets around the world at very short notice (Global Strike). The first bullet point was “Need to ‘Map the Human Terrain cross the Kill Chain—Enables the entire Kill Chain for GWOT’” (Global War on Terrorism). (The Kill Chain is a linked sequence of operations: Plan, Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess). Montgomery McFate said about this that
Undersecretary Wilcox “is in no way connected with HTS” (Gonzalez 2008:22, 25; McFate 2008:27). That is the point. Cultural information collected by HTS, and by other DoD programs, will be totally integrated within the full spectrum of DoD operations.

Cultural perspectives will not be restricted to actual field operations. In the DoD vision, they will stream into a trans-disciplinary security social science (Jaschik 2008a). Working together over time, these diverse disciplinary perspectives are imagined as developing trans-disciplinary theory for application to and prediction of security issues. Hypotheses and data will be run through sophisticated computer models (see Gonzalez, this volume). For instance, the Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation recently called for papers for a special issue:

Modeling, simulating and prognosticating the Human Terrain of deployed force’s area(s) of operation is recognized as being increasingly important for U.S. and Coalition Forces during counter-insurgency and stability operations. While marketing and advertising agencies have proven successes in rapidly assessing niche populations and the ability to meet their wants and needs, this is still a “white space” in the defense modeling/
Challenges for DoD Investment
- What Have We Learned?

ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
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- Need to 'Map the Human Terrain' across the Kill Chain
  - Enables the entire Kill Chain for the GWOT
- Target Detection may be Difficult and Require Non-Traditional Means
- Enemy Exists inside potentially High Collateral Damage Areas
  - And... in Denied Access Areas
- Sometimes We ID the Enemy but....
  - ... do not have an adequate/appropriate Strike Solution in time
- Mobile / Re-locatable Targets Remain a Problem!
- The Target Characteristics may Remain Unknown even at... Time Over Target ... & “How Did We Do?”
- If Decision Timeline Varies and can be Long... let's Enable the Rest of the Kill Chain to be Dynamically Responsive

Figure 5: “Challenges for DoD Investment--What Have We Learned?”

Source: Wilcox 2007, Slide 1
simulations and tool building communities. This special issue is therefore interested in contributions that forecast population response to different messaging (e.g. kinetic operations, cordon and search, reconstruction...) during the “clear/hold/build” phases of military operations; providing measurable and reproducible “atmospheric” estimates over a range of time horizons (Society for Modeling and Simulation International 2009).

The Deputy Director of the Information Exploitation Office of DARPA (typically) saw this coming years ago.

We believe the way forward is clear... What is needed is a strategy that leads to a greater cultural awareness and thorough social understanding of the threats comprising the new strategic triad [failed states, WMD, terrorism]. ...the path to understand people, their cultures, motivations, intentions, opinions and perceptions lies in applying interdisciplinary quantitative and computational social science methods from mathematics, statistics, economics, political science, cultural anthropology, sociology, neuroscience, and modeling simulation... These analytical techniques apply to cognition and decision-making. They make forecasts about conflict and cooperation and do so at all levels of data aggregation from the individual to groups, tribes, societies, nation states, and the globe... Victory in the 21st century strategic threat environment no longer belongs to the side that owns the best and most sophisticated ISR or weapon systems. It belongs to the side that can combine these cutting-edge technological marvels, which emerged from the physical sciences, with methods from the quantitative and computational social sciences (Popp 2005).

By this point, it may have occurred to the reader that the military’s vision of using culture
constitutes an impossible fantasy of omniscience and omnipotence. The fighting arm of the U.S. will know all, everywhere that matters—what makes locals tick, how to make them move. The DoD (and associates) will have its thumb on the local pulse wherever “U.S. interests” may be at stake—monitoring, predicting, channeling, even transforming societies from the ground up. One appropriate response to this aspiration would be, “give me a break!” But even if unattainable, when the DoD deems something necessary, they spend the money to get it. Paying for social science is peanuts for the Pentagon, and its effects will be real.

**Militarizing Anthropology**

How will the security demand for culture manifest itself for the discipline of anthropology? To borrow a phrase, the impact will be full spectrum, changing conditions in education, employment, and research. A very large impact is expectable in education—in teaching possibilities within the DoD, in a militarization of campuses in general, and strains on anthropology programs specifically.

**Military Education.** Inside the military, a vast archipelago of educational programs demand cultural perspectives. That means a lot of anthropology teachers and instructional products. The Institute for Defense Analysis surveyed in-house military cultural education.

The core hypothesis behind this project initially, that there was a lack of cultural training programs, proved to be inaccurate... The colorful and crowded cultural awareness training landscape features a range of diverse programs, all with workshops, symposia, and a multitude of training offerings. In addition to the vastness of the landscape with respect to the programs and initiatives, the variety of emphases and missions cannot be overstated (Alrich 2008:2).
Instruction comes in many forms. There are one-off lectures for predeployment forces, and short courses on military bases, on Intro Anthro or Islam (Capuzzo 2007). One big growth area is online training and education resources.

The integration of a Warfighter Cultural Awareness (WCA) curriculum and correspondence program into military readiness training, as well as having a means to furnish technologies to assist the warfighter in the field are necessary as the US military continues to prepare for future engagement. Similar to existing correspondence courses, these would be micro courses focused on the relevant information—pertinent to the region, country, and province—that a soldier would need to know about an area that they will be operating [sic?]. The first phase is to integrate an online systems that a soldier can access and take such courses to expand their cultural awareness skills (Masellis 2009:14).

There are higher level collegiate and post-graduate venues for anthropological instruction within the military.

The military educational complex is large: there are the three well-known service academies that provide a college education for aspiring officers: West Point, Annapolis and the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. There are the Command and Staff Colleges where senior officers spend a year, sometimes two–six of them... Each of these educational institutions is staffed by military intellectuals... most of these educational establishments are host to one or more military think-tanks or research groups...

(Roxborough 2008:2-3).

However they may be staffed or structured, a great surge in military education in language and culture is assuredly on the way.
Elsewhere in this report, we have noted a number of current Department initiatives to improve language and cultural capabilities and to increase educational and training programs that prepare our people to work in and among foreign populations. We see these efforts as among the Department’s most important investments in support of effective strategic communication... In addition to bolstering the Armed Forces’ ability to conduct COIN, stability, and CT [counterterrorism] operations, these investments will improve capacity for peacekeeping operations. These investments will also facilitate unconventional warfare operations or conventional military operations against state or non-state adversaries (QDR 2010:25-26)

**Militarizing Campuses.** Moving outside the Camo Tower to consider our universities, Secretary Gates, former President of Texas A&M, called ringingly for greatly increased cooperation between the DoD and research universities. Campuses as a whole are targeted for a major increase in military/security engagement: opening them for more ROTC programs, “actively promoting the military as a career option, or giving full support to military recruiters on campus... [and] wide-ranging initiatives to recognize veterans for the knowledge they have...”

Online courses should be offered for military personnel that are “immediately relevant—the history of the Middle East, anthropology classes on tribal culture, and so on.” To encourage participation, universities could offer degree credit for these courses—“the Department could offer logistical advice” (Gates 2008:3). Beyond individual universities, Secretary Gates envisions “a consortia of universities that will promote research in specific areas,” (2008:2) encouraged by Minerva funding (below). After a closed-door meetings with Secretary Gates, presidents of major universities were reportedly enthusiastic, even “extraordinarily excited” by the proposal of
greater collaboration between the Pentagon and US universities (Jaschik 2008a:2).

The Intelligence Community is already farther along than that. Two current programs bring intelligence agencies on to campuses. The Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program was the first manifestation of security engagement to attract attention within anthropology (see Price 2005a). PRISP is a scholarship program for individual students, who receive substantial funding to study languages and topics, cultural and otherwise, which are of direct interest to the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Applicants go through a security investigation, polygraph test, and drug screening. Recipients must have an internship with an approved agency. After graduation, they are required to spend one and one-half the duration of their funded studies in the employ of an intelligence agency, or pay back the scholarship at punitive rates of interest (DIA n.d.; Price 2005b). Faculty have no way of knowing if one of these intelligence trainees is in their class.

Only recently coming to broader attention (Price 2010a) is the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) Program. Presently offered are renewable $600,000 grants for adjusting universities to long-term intelligence needs. CAE will “create a new diverse talent pool from which the intelligence community can recruit” (CAE n.d.: Home Page). All participating universities will

- Develop or enhance curriculum to build the skill sets needed in the IC professions.
- Conduct pre-collegiate outreach in their geographic regions.
- Host a colloquium with consortium universities to heighten IC issues and careers.
- Send at least ten “IC Scholars” abroad to obtain language and cultural awareness or immersion experiences.
- Provide end of grading period reports for oversight and compliance of all program
requirements.

Particularly noteworthy is the high school outreach requirement. CAE also will expect universities to "[f]orge cross-disciplinary cooperative relationships" (CAE n.d.: Grants). Expect more joint appointments to anthropology and other programs, especially area studies. This would have the additional effect of breaking down a disciplinary identity, and so commitment to anthropological definitions of ethics.

In two rounds, 2005-2006 and 2009-2010, 22 U.S. universities have developed a relationship with CAE. The second round included such major institutions as the University of Maryland, College Park, the Universities of New Mexico and Nebraska, Pennsylvania State, and Virginia Polytechnic (CAE n.d.: Institutions). Of course, a major intelligence presence on U.S. campuses is hardly something new (Price’s 2004; 2008).

(From my limited reading, the Intelligence Community seems to lag behind DoD in self-culturization. In the IC Strategic Human Capital Plan [DNI 2006], there is nary a mention of cultural or ethnographic competence. Both PRISP and CAE have an old-fashioned “foreign language and areas” orientation. Recall that Flynn has publically castigated the standard intelligence orientation in Afghanistan, which is not what is needed in counterinsurgency operations. We may soon see the IC playing cultural catch-up).

**Anthropology Programs.** My guess is that most who teach in colleges and universities already have service men and women in their class rooms. At Rutgers-Newark, I get many, and they and their interests are welcome. I also get the standard office-hours question, "What can you do with an anthropology degree, even a BA"? I include the military/intelligence possibilities, and we talk about it. At graduate levels, be prepared for a surge of enrollments in
anthropology MA and Certificate programs. For anyone charting a military career today, or someone from another social science wanting to re-tool in an ethnographic direction, an MA or Certificate would be a solid investment, especially if somehow subsidized by DoD. University administrations love MA and Certificate programs.

Then there are PhDs, military persons who obtain the highest degree from research universities. It is frequently emphasized that the training of senior officers “should extend to the world’s best graduate schools” (Joint Forces Command 2009:49). This is a challenge facing graduate programs in anthropology today. If they enroll a military person for a PhD in anthropology, will they do fieldwork under departmental auspices, like any other fledgling anthropologist? How would IRB’s handle this dual orientation? How would a department even categorize someone as a military person? Many would come in after leaving active duty, intending to utilize their anthropological training in future security contexts. If anthropology departments have not met to consider this, they should.

As more military anthropologists achieve higher degrees, they will expand the possibility of “grow our own” alternative, in which higher-level anthropology training takes place within military post-graduate institutes, thus bypassing AAA professional concerns (Connable 2009:64). Regrettably, the anthropological community in academia has tremendous reservations about working with the military... a specialized group of ethnographers is urgently needed. The solution is for the Department of Defense to grow its own cultural experts–hybrids between soldier and anthropologists, who may not have to be uniformed, but do have to look at cultural matters from a security standpoint (Renzi 2006a:12-13) According to John Allison, a cultural anthropologist who joined then resigned in protest from the
Human Terrain program, this is happening now. "[T]he military is beginning to do an end run by producing its own anthropologists/social scientist PhDs at West Point, the Air Force Academy, the Naval Academy and other cooperating institutions; thus marginalizing the criticism" (quoted in Price 2010:4).

**Funded and Promoted Research.** Another broad front of the military invasion will be on anthropological research. In April 2008, Secretary Gates announced the Minerva Research Initiative (Asher 2008; Gates 2008; Jaschick 2008a, b). Building on a series of private meetings with leaders of the Association of American Universities, Minerva aims to engage disciplines such as history, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology, on topics of “strategic importance to U.S. National Policy.” Details followed (Asher 2008). $10 million per year for five years was made available in a Pentagon administered program, with five topic areas: Chinese military and technology, strategic impact of religious and cultural changes in the Islamic world, analysis of appropriated (some say looted) Iraqi archives, terrorist organizations and ideologies, and an “other” category of new approaches to national security, conflict, and cooperation.

After discussion and criticism of the Pentagon’s direct control over funding, another $8 million (or more) for three years was allocated to be administered by the NSF, but with DOD input on reviewers, and other strings attached. Combined, that’s $74 million, minimum, for five years. The NSF topics are: terrorist organizations and ideologies, strategic impact of religious and cultural changes, and political, cultural, and social dynamics under authoritarian regimes. In the first 24 grants announced for both programs, the largest number (6) concern terrorism or insurgency, with clusters on group behavioral psychology and dynamics (4), environmental
security (2), conflict in weak or authoritarian states (3), post-conflict recovery (2), plus several
that cannot be lumped with others (Minerva n.d.a). One cannot tell the value of a proposal from
its title, but by the titles, most of these seem like worthwhile projects. Notably absent is any title
that hints at a critical perspective on U.S. military or other security projects. The Social Science
Research Council posts a panel of thoughtful commentaries on Minerva, and its prospective
affect on social sciences. Gusterson (2008) and Lutz (2008) notably, worry that expanded
engagement through Minerva/NSF funding will bend the priorities and practices of anthropology
into the military orbit. Researchers will gravitate toward studying what the DoD wants studied.
No doubt additional sources of security-related funding will come.

Both research funding programs are explicitly intended to cross disciplines, to build a
new community of security science researchers, “to foster a new generation of engaged
scholarship in the social sciences” (Minerva n.d.b). Besides creating a network of civilian
security researchers, the DoD also intends to connect a multi-disciplinary scholars directly to the
military establishment. The Human Terrain System calls for development of a network of area
specialists to call on whenever needed (Kipp et al. 2006:14) The Defense Science Board Task
Force (DSB 2009: xiv) puts this in an odd and interesting way

[B]oth the Army and Air Force reported that each maintained an extensive network of
expert cultural consultants. The combatant commands also have their own “rolodex
files”... [but the DoD as a whole lacks] procedures, funding lines, and automated expert
finder/locator for effectively engaging and leveraging expertise in industry and academia.
Academic, NGOs and commercial operations have considerable expertise in human
dynamics and are strongly motivated to continuously improve their expertise, as they seek
to help and/or sell to all, friend and foe alike. The Department does not currently optimize use of these capabilities, which could augment military capabilities during operations and offer greater depth of human dynamics understanding. Recognizing the importance of such cross-disciplinary interactions, Secretary Gates is actively working to reassure those who may be reluctant to collaborate with the Department of Defense...

Beyond connection to military and intelligence personnel in military Areas of Operations, civilian experts will interface with a full spectrum of military intellectuals.

The military educational complex is large: there are the three well-known service academies that provide a college education for aspiring officers: West Point, Annapolis and the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. There are the Command and Staff Colleges where senior officers spend a year, sometimes two-six of them... Each of these educational institutions is staffed by military intellectuals... most of these educational establishments are host to one or more military think-tanks or research groups... In addition, there are also less familiar institutions: the doctrine commands (in each service and in the Joint Staff) where military intellectuals attempt to distill the lessons of recent operations. Here there are teams of people focused on thinking about such thing as social networks, command and control systems, the causes of political conflict, the future shape of the human world, etc. Then there is the Pentagon, a hot-house of staff officers seeking to influence the Washington political system. In short, there are many hundreds of military officers scattered about bases throughout the country doing what we would think of as social science research (Roxborough 2008:2-3).

**Militarization of Normal Anthropological Research.** Perhaps the broadest connection
of the military and anthropology is already at hand, not through funding new research, but through the diligent mining and sifting of normal, published research and dissertations. The most important fount of anthropological data—at least until the DoD gets its own global scouts of hybrid anthro-soldiers in place—will not be from HTS social scientists, but from what security people call “open sources.” The head of military intelligence in Afghanistan concludes open source information makes up 90% of the intelligence future, clandestine work merely being more dramatic (Flynn et al. 2010:23). The standard operating procedure now for Human Terrain Teams is to pose a problem for the Reachback Cells stateside to investigate through open source materials. As anthropologist John Allison wrote to David Price (2010b:3), before he quit the HTS:

One interesting fact that was revealed today is that the time that an anthropologist or social scientist has to finish an interview before the probability of a sniper attack becomes drastically high, is about 7 minutes. How deep an understanding, rapport or trust develops in 7 minutes? It seems that the “data” sought is very limited to operationally tactically useful stuff. For anything deeper, they “reach back” to the research centers for work from anthropologists that they will use without permission and without attribution (emphasis in original).

A similar evaluation was made by another HTS team member in the field: “Without the ability to truly immerse yourself in the population, existing knowledge of the culture... is critical. Lacking that, we were basically an open-source research cell” (Ephron and Spring 2008:2).

HTS Reachback specialists, and “deskbound analysts” in other programs and institutions, constitute another major source of employment for anyone with any sort of anthropology degree.
(see Kipp et al 2007). These analysts will be part of the process of streaming together anthropological data with other sources of intelligence. For instance, BAE Systems, the former contractor of the Human Terrain System, advertised for a “Senior Human Terrain Analyst” to use new toolkits to “address specific, often time sensitive topics that normally include the fusion of SIGINT data, tribal/cultural patterns, message traffic, imagery, open source and advanced geospatial technologies” (BAE 2009).

Given the overarching, insistence emphasis on standardizing information and integrating it within interoperational data sets, it can safely be assumed that these textual sources are being analyzed and coded for recovery and modeling. High aspirations are plain in a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA 2008) call for funding applications on automated reading and processing of natural language texts. This imagined system would apply to academic publications, print media, and web postings, going beyond what may be accomplished by human reader/processors. “Manually encoding such knowledge can become prohibitively expensive... the goal of the MRP [Machine Reading Program] is to create an automated Reading System that serves as a bridge between knowledge contained in natural texts and the formal reasoning systems that need such knowledge” (6).

FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE: DARPA 2008:13

“Notional Concept of a Universal Reading Machine”
Text Corpus

(e.g., AP newswire articles)

Interface Ontology for Pre-Existing Knowledge

Terrorist Group
- Activity
- Target
- Location

Terrorism Reasoning System
(e.g., terrorist-network analysis software, human counterterrorism analyst)

Pre-Existing Knowledge

Problem Solving Context

Analyst

AI System

Figure 1- Notional Concept of a Universal Reading System

Figure 6: “Notional Concept of a Universal Reading Machine”

Source: DARPA 2008:13
All anthropologists working in any area of potential interest to U.S. security agencies—and that is much of the world—should understand that any ethnographic information they publish, any sort of explanation of why those people do what they do, may be assimilated into the great network of security data bases and modeling systems, and through them made available to military, intelligence, and other security practitioners.

Price (2008) describes how U.S. military needs around World War II contributed to the development of basic anthropological research projects and tools, such as area handbooks and the Human Relations Area Files. Thus he notes the irony that the leaked Human Terrain Handbook calls for contributing Human Terrain data to the HRAF data base. "This practice will also allow us to tie into the HRAF database and compare the existence of one social practice, symbolic system, or historical process in our area of operations with others elsewhere in the world. Such cross-cultural analysis enables us to get closer to explaining causation and make weak assertions of what will likely happen in the population in the near future" (Finney 2008, quoted in Price 2008:3). But given the plans for data integration and modeling described elsewhere in this chapter, the new DoD efforts will make HRAF correlational studies seem like the horse and buggy. And given high level pledges of research openness (Gates 2008), anthropologists will be invited to use these tools—or some of them anyway—although these tools will have an inherent bias toward topics of security interest. The scholarly possibilities will be bedazzling.

The DoD Cultural Revolution will have a profound impact on anthropology and its environment. People with degrees from BA to PhD will find work with the military as teachers and analysts. (What may be distasteful for a tenured professor may seem quite different for a young person trying to set up a life and family). Campuses and social sciences will reorient to
security needs. Militarily-oriented culture-seekers will permeate anthropology teaching programs. Militarily useful anthropology will be trained into soldier-anthropologist hybrids, who reproduce their own. Academic research will be funded and otherwise channeled into security relevant topics. All “open source” work with possible security relevance will be assimilated into the great security networks and nodes of synthesis, analysis, and prediction.

Conclusion

This chapter assumes that the DoD emphasis on culture will continue. What if the current COIN strategy in Afghanistan does not succeed? In my estimate, it is very likely to fail. But it is very unlikely that a lack of success will lead to a turn away from culture-centric counterinsurgency. As with the CORDS/Phoenix counterinsurgency program in Vietnam, blame will go elsewhere—the program got started too late, the American public had already lost the will to continue fighting, etc. (Andrade and Willbanks 2006; White n.d.). The emphasis on Global COIN and CT—often put in harness with Stability Operations—will not go away. As documented in this chapter, the DoD Cultural Revolution has gone too far to turn back, permeating its power centers.

And the emphasis on COIN/GT will not go away because too much depends on it. Even for those in the DoD who question the emphasis on counterinsurgency, these spotlighted global challenges give the Pentagon something it desperately needs—an unending rationale for massive military spending. As the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2010) puts it:

Stability operations, large-scale counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations are not niched challenges or the responsibility of a single Military Department, but rather require a portfolio of capabilities as well as sufficient capacity from across America’s
Armed Forces and other departments and agencies. Nor are these types of operations a transitory or anomalous phenomenon in the security landscape. On the contrary, we must expect that for the indefinite future, violent extremist groups, with or without state sponsorship, will continue to foment instability and challenge U.S. and allied interests. Even if many of the DoD’s high-budget items are of little relevance to G-COIN/CT/SO, terrorist-linked insurgents provide the critical fear factor that underlies continuing increases in defense budgets. ‘It’s a dangerous world out there. We are locked in a life and death struggle with deadly fanatics who thrive on disorder. We must spend whatever it takes to give our brave soldiers, placed in harms way, whatever it takes to prevail, and to protect America.’ This premise permeates our political discourse. Take away terrorism and insurgency, and where is the visceral danger for U.S. voters? Why should we channel half of federal government’s entire discretionary spending into the military? Counterinsurgency strategy may not prevail on the battlefields of the third world, but it is a winner in Washington. In D.C., where talk of the weather is polarized, there is scarcely any debate about military strategy. Leave it to the generals.

The DoD is only the biggest dog in the room. The DoD focus of this chapter leaves out other ways security-oriented institutions will engage anthropology. Think tanks and private corporations of many sorts are trying to assimilate anthropology and anthropologists. Within government, plans for civilian surges (DeYoung 2009; Jelinek 2009) and stability operations (Center for Technology and National Security Policy 2008, DoA 2009)—all with situationally variable connections to DoD operations—will necessarily involve major involvement with foreign cultures. One big development to watch is rapidly expanding Civilian Response Corps, under the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. This interagency
management program aims to increase capacity for both rapid and long-term deployment of
civilian experts in all forms of civil development, to any crisis area around the world, including
at home (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization web site; and see
Binnendijk and Cronin 2008). In foreign environments, civilian technicians will need cultural
competance and ethnographic intelligence too. Under State Department auspices, social
scientists would not work for the military, but they often would work with the military, and that
creates a new layer of situational complexity.

There can be no unified anthropological position on the tsunami of security engagement.
Specific situations will be so complicated that ethical and political evaluation can only be in
specific terms. Different anthropologists will evaluate them differently, according to their own
issues and perspectives. Disciplinary ethics—do no harm, informed consent, etc.—have been the
mainframes of public debate. But there is also the question what constitutes good anthropology,
and if bad anthropology is being purveyed, should we try to improve it? Anthropologists who
have studied US militarism at home and abroad tend to be highly critical of any engagement.
Those who have worked for or within security-related institutions are more open. Applied
anthropologists, generally, are more open than academic anthropologists. Geographic area of
expertise brings its own military demand, and the detailed appreciation of local realities that goes
far beyond general opinion in the field. Personal moral and political convictions will shape
reactions to possibilities of engagement. Those will be combined with individual evaluations of
a particular conflict situation, and the larger politics of the U.S. administration that is in power.

One very broad concern is the impact of a more culturally competent and expansive U.S.
military on the subaltern people with whom we have typically worked, who often struggle against
oppressive conditions and repressive governments. What happens to the people if the DoD gets to where it wants to be in culturally-attuned COIN? Another very broad concern is the impact of a deepening security engagement on the way people we work with see anthropologists. Project Camelot tarnished anthropology and brought individual fieldworkers under suspicion. Current global reach efforts will leave Camelot in the dust. To be clear, I would definitely not rule out all forms of engagement. Opportunities should be considered situation by situation. But all those situations are being created by powerful agencies that can manipulate incentives to increase cooperation. The sum total of individual decisions may result in a profound shift for the discipline as a whole.

I have my own idiosyncratic perspective, based on decades of cross-cultural inquiry into the causes of war (Ferguson 1999:402-403; 2003:28-29; 2006; 2009:43-46). I claim that across human societies, military policies express the practical self-interests of those who make decisions for war. These include external ("foreign") relations, but just as important, they reflect internal ("domestic") interests in political competition. This generalization goes for the U.S. just as anywhere else. What is called "national security" may not do anything for ordinary citizens, though they are the ones who pay the price in taxes and blood. Based on cross-cultural study of war, it is expectable that national security policies will reinforce the power structure that has evolved in the United States, and that varying perspectives on security challenges will be employed instrumentally by competitive elements within the power structure. Also by the theory, all will invoke the highest applicable moral justifications for their positions; and most will actually believe there cause is righteous.

Except in rare cases where societies are ruled by absolute dictators, war leaders must
enlist support. In the USA, national security policies must also get a pass through the pluralistic and decentralized political participation of our democratic system. Big decisions get made by log rolling. Anthropologists and social scientists—thought leaders by our writing and teaching, technocrats by our expertise—are being rolled. By manipulating incentive structures, the DoD is trying to manufacture conformity, if not consent, to its priorities.

Any anthropologist considering closer work with the DoD and other security agencies really should make themselves aware for the record of past engagements (beginning with Price 2004; 2008a). But they should also be think about our future. The military invasion of anthropology must be recognized in its scope and ambition. Anthropologists should study it, and challenge it by directing more research, publications, and teaching to US militarism and its consequences, at home and abroad. Resistance is not futile.

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